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I. COUNSEL MAY APPROPRIATELY REPRESENT ALL APPELLANTS. 
Interstate objects to attorneys Ronald C. Barker and Larry 
L. Whyte as counsel for the five appellants. It should be 
noted that Larry L. Whyte is no longer associated with this law 
office as he has recently accepted an offer from another firm. 
Mr. Whyte has been replaced by David C. Cundick. 
Interstate's sole argument against counsel representing all 
appellants is that the Ingersolls are named on the caption of 
this case as proposed plaintiffs in intervention and appellants 
while Patterson is named as a proposed defendant in intervention 
and appellant. Interstate maintains that this is a violation of 
the Rule 1.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Interstate 
argues that because of the caption of this casef Patterson and 
the Ingersolls are opposing parties. This is not correct, 
Patterson and the Ingersolls1 positions are not inconsistent. 
Additionallyf this is the identical argument that Interstate made 
in its' Motion for Summary Disposition which was filed before 
this Court on or about February 3, 1987. The Court denied that 
motion on or about March 4, 1987. It is apparent, thereforef 
that this Court has already heard and decided against Interstate 
on this repeated argument. 
There are no conflicts of interest between Patterson and the 
Ingersolls. To the contrary, Patterson wishes that Ingersolls1 
appeal be granted so that Ingersolls can intervene as co-defen-
dant with Patterson. Additionally, it is important to note that 
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Patterson and the Ingersolls1 interest in the property subject to 
this dispute is an undivided interest. It is obvious that there 
is no ethical problem of counsels' representation in this matter. 
II. THIS COURT HAS PROPER JURISDICTION. 
1. The Court has already heard Interstate1s argument 
concerning jurisdiction. Respondent Interstate argues that 
Patterson and the Ingersolls failed to file a notice of appeal as 
required within thirty (30) days after entry of a final order by 
the lower court. This is the same argument that Interstate made 
in its1 Motion for Summary Disposition which was filed before this 
Court on or about February 3if 1987. The Court denied that motion 
on or about March 4, 1987, which should make this repeated 
argument moot. Patterson and the Ingersolls will address the 
merits of this argument on the chance that the Court may for some 
unknown reason wish to reconsider the issue. 
2. Appellants' Motion to Correct Order was not defective. 
Interstate's main contention stems from the Honorable Judge 
Michael R. Murphy's Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 
Patterson and Ingersolls' Motion to Correct Order. (see 
Memorandum Opinion and Order attached hereto as exhibit "a", page 
3, 1[2.) The contention is that when Patterson and the Ingersolls 
brought a timely Motion to Correct Order under URCP 59 after the 
lower court entered judgment against them, the motion was 
defective as a procedural matter/ that because the motion was 
allegedly defective, it allegedly failed to toll the thirty (30) 
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day limitation period for bringing an appeal after judgment has 
been entered. Patterson and Ingersoll believe that the Motion 
was proper for the following reasons: 
3. A summary judgment is a trial. Interstate complains 
that a motion to correct under URCP 59 is defective since there 
has not been a trial. Such is not the case. Black's Law 
Dictionaryy fifth ed. p. 1348f defines trial as; "a judicial 
examination and determination of issues between parties to 
action, whether they be issues of law or of fact." (citations 
ommitted.) Clearly the lower court made a judicial determination 
of issues of law when it entered judgment granting Interstate's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. If it failed to make such a 
determination, the court by definition would have acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner in rendering its1 decision. 
Interstate, in its1 brief, offers no authority to the contrary. 
In any event, summary judgment is a trial and a motion to correct 
is proper under URCP 59. 
4. Federal courts allow a FRCP 59 motion where there has 
not been a formal trial. The Tenth Circut Court of Appeals, in 
Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir., 1983), allowed an 
appeal under FRCP 59 where the district court ruled against the 
appellant on a motion for summary judgment. As noted in Appel-
lants1 Brief (see Appellants1 brief, page 17, 1[ 2), the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals is not alone in holding that FRCP 59 is 
proper procedure for a party seeking to vacate summary judgment 
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even though there has not been a formal trial with witnesses. 
5. The holding in Vreeken is sound law. Interstate 
questions the soundness of the Vreeken decision. In Vreeken, the 
court succintly described the procedural facts as follows: 
In the instant case, the district court stated in open 
court that it would grant the defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment; it then entered the summary judgment order 
on March 30f 1982. In the interim, on March 23, the 
plaintiffs filed a pleading styled "Motion for Leave to File a 
Second Amended Complaint," which the court denied on May 28, 
1982. On June 25, 1982, the plaintiffs filed a notice of 
appeal. Thus, unless the plaintiffs1 motion of March 23 
tolled the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal 
on the summary judgment order, the plaintiffs1 notice of 
appeal was untimely except as to the denial of the motion to 
file an amended complaint. Id. at page 345. 
The Tenth Circuit then stated that even though plaintifffs 
Motion for leave to File a Second Amended Complaint was made 
pursuant to FRCP 60(b), the court would treat it as a FRCP 59(e) 
motion, Id. at page 345. 
Interstate argues that, "In Vreeken, the court ignored the 
plain meaning of a motion and held that a motion to file an 
amended complaint was somehow intended to be a motion to alter of 
amend the judgment." (See Interstate's brief, page 3 112). What 
Interstate fails to point out is that the court went on to note 
that even though the motion was styled as a motion for leave to 
file an amended complaint, the motion specifically requested in 
the motion itself that the district court treat the motion as one 
made pursuant to FRCP 59, Id. at page 345. The Tenth Circuit, 
therefore, did not act as irrational as Interstate would lead 
this Court to believe. To the contrary, the Tenth Circuit simply 
_
 4 . 
gave a liberal view to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
allowed the plaintiffs1 motion in the district court to toll the 
running of the time for filing a notice of appeal on the summary 
judgment order. 
While the merits of the Vreeken decision are based upon the 
facts in that case, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has adopted the rule that a FRCP 59 motion tolls the time 
for taking an appeal, whether the motion follows a trial with 
live witnesses or a summary judgment. 
There is no sound legal reason why the trial court should be 
permited to re-examine and to possibly correct its1 decision on a 
URCP 59 motion following a trial with live witnesses, but should 
not be permitted to do so following a summary judgment trial. To 
permit the court to re-examine and, if appropriate, to correct 
its summary judgment decision may avoid many unnecessary and 
costly appeals. 
6. The holding in Durkin should not apply to the facts of 
this case. Interstate argues that Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 
879 (E.D. Va. 1977), which did not authorize a party who had lost 
a motion for summary judgment to file a motion to alter judment 
under FRCP 59(e), is applicable to the facts of this case. In 
Durkin, however, the appellant was not barred from bringing his 
appeal by the courtfs harsh application of rule 59. In the 
present case, Patterson and the Ingersolls brought their Motion 
to Correct Order in good faith and with persuasive legal support 
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that the Motion complied with proper procedure. To allow a narrow 
and harsh application of rule 59 such as is argued by Interstate 
would be inequitable, especially when one considers Patterson and 
Ingersolls1 previous argument that URCP 59 is more broadly 
drafted that FRCP 59 (see appellant's brief, page 16f 1(1). 
7. Interstate1s argument concerning rule 2.9(b) is 
irrelevant to cases in the Third Judicial District Court. 
Interstate argues that neither Patterson nor the Ingersolls 
filed any objection to Interstatefs proposed order even though 
Interstate complied with the requirements of Rule 2.9(b) of the 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of 
the State of Utah (see Interstate fs brief, page 6, 1f 1). 
Interstate reasons that because Patterson and the Ingersolls 
failed to object to its1 proposed order as required by Rule 2.9, 
they cannot attack the substance of the proposed order on appeal. 
Interstate fails to recognize Rule 5 of the Local Rules of the 
Third Judicial District Court. Rule 5 specifically states that: 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
of the State of Utah shall not apply in the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
Rule 5 further states: 
(b) Copies of the proposed order . . . shall be served on 
opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature unless approved as to form by opposing counsel, 
or the court otherwise orders. (emphasis added.) 
Rule 5 suggests that any objection Patterson or the 
Ingersolls made to Interstate's proposed order is appropriate 
only to the form of such proposed order. Patterson and the 
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Ingersolls1 objection to the proposed order in the lower court 
was to the content of the proposed order and as such an objection 
under Rule 5 would not have been correct as a procedural matter. 
III. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE. 
1. There is no conclusive evidence showing that the lower 
court granted summary judgment for reasons of collateral estoppel 
and res judicata. Interstate contends as an undisputed fact that 
the lower court granted summary judgment based on the doctrine of 
res judicata and/or collateral estoppel (see, respondent's brief, 
page 11, 1f 1). There is, however, no evidence to support such an 
allegation, nor can Interstate show such evidence. The clear 
facts of the case show that no reason was ever stated as to why 
the motion for summary judgment was granted. 
2. Interstate1s collateral estoppel argument is not 
appropriate to the facts of this case. This Court, In Re Town of 
West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391,393, 326 P.2d 105,107 (1958), 
explained the applicability of collateral estoppel, stating: 
That doctrine only applies where a question of fact essential 
to and determinative of the judgment is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid or final judgment which is conclusive as 
between the parties to a subsequent action on a different 
cause of action. 
To apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel Interstate must 
show that an issue present in the case at bar was already 
litigated between the parties in a previous action. Interstate 
feebly argues that the issues of the present case were already 
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litigated in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 
C78-7764. A copy of Ingersolls1 Amended Complaint, which sets 
forth the issues of the case, is attached hereto as "exhibit bn. 
In that case the issues involved for litigation included: 
1. Whether the Ingersolls were entitled to a declaratory 
judgment with respect to the validity and effect of certain 
Salt Lake City Ordinances; 
2. Whether the Ingersolls could receive an injunction against 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co* enjoining it from interferring with 
the same property of this present case as a use by the public 
as a public thoroughfare; and, 
3. Whether the Ingersolls were entitled to damages in 
connection with Mountain Fuel Supply Co. prohibiting the 
public from using the property as a thoroughfare. 
The issues in the Salt Lake City case all involved the 
validity of certain Salt Lake Ordinances and whether such 
ordinances were effective to maintain the property as a public 
road. Such issues are significantly different from the issues of 
the present case which involve the rights of parties to ownership 
of the same property now that it has been determined that Salt 
Lake City no longer has use of the property as a public road. 
3. Interstate1s res judicata argument is not appropriate to 
the facts of this case. The doctrine of res judicata is 
adequately explained in 46 Am.Jur. Judgments, §394. It provides: 
. . . the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final 
judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes 
of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the 
parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or 
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 
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In order to find that res judicata is applicable to the 
facts of this case, Interstate must show that this cause of 
action has previously been litigated in the Salt Lake City case. 
This is not possible since the cause of action in the previous 
case was to decide the validity of Salt Lake City Ordinances 172, 
173 and 200. The Ingersolls were unsuccessful in arguing that 
the ordinances were valid. Ownership of the property was not 
decided in that case and therefore there is no res judicata 
argument available for Interstate is this present action. 
It is interesting that Interstate argues in its1 brief that, 
"since the ownership of the vacated property was the central 
issue in the Salt Lake City Case, this Court should apply the 
doctrine of res judicata to bar the Ingersolls1 proposed 
complaint in intervention in this case (see, Interstates'• brief, 
pages 46 and 47). If ownership of the vacated property was 
indeed the central issue in the Salt Lake City Case, it would 
appear that Interstate would be barred in the present action 
against Patterson for those same principles of res judicata. It 
is obvious that ownership was not the central issue of the Salt 
Lake City Case and that the principles of res judicata are not 
applicable to the facts of the present case. 
IV. THE INGERSOLLS1 DID NOT MAKE BARE ALLEGATIONS IN ARGUING 
AGAINST INTERSTATEfS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Interstate erroneously argues that Patterson and the 
Ingersolls should not be allowed to claim on appeal that there is 
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a disputed issue of fact because Patterson and the Ingersolls 
submitted no affidavits or memorandum in opposition to 
Interstate1 Motion for Summary Judgment (see, Interstate's brief, 
page 30f K 2). Interstate, however, fails to understand the 
language of URCP 56 (c)• Speaking directly to procedure 
involving summary judgmentr the rule provides: 
. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings • • . on filef together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. . . . (emphasis added). 
The Ingersolls attached exhibits to their Proposed Complaint 
in Intervention (a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit 
"c"), meaning that the Ingersolls did not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of their pleadings but that the exhibits 
attached to their Proposed Complaint in Intervention, which was 
on file with the court, supported their allegations and/or 
denials. Therefore, Patterson and the Ingersolls are free to 
argue the existence of a material fact on appeal. 
V, INTERSTATE MISAPPLIES UCA 57-1-20 
1. OCA 57-1-20 conveys title only as security. UCA 57-1-20 
states: 
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the 
performance of an obligation of the trustor . « . to a bene-
eficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the 
trust property acquired by the trustor, or his successors in 
interest, subsequent to the execution of the trust deed shall 
inure to the trustee as security for the obligation or oblig-
ations for which the trust property is conveyed in like manner 
as if acquired before execution of the trust deed. (emphasis 
added.) 
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Interstate, in its1 brief, goes to great extents to show 
that title passes to the trustee when a trust deed is created 
(seef Interstate's brief, pages 34-41). Patterson and the 
Ingersolls strongly assert that in accordance with UCA 57-1-20, 
title inured to the trustee only for purposes of security and 
nothing else. 
2. Ownership of the property remained with the Ingersolls 
and Lemel after the trust deed was executed. As established in 
Appellants1 brief (see, Appellants1 brief pages 10-11) and agreed 
to in Respondent Interstatefs brief (see, Interstate's brief, 
page 41, 11 1), Utah is a lien state with respect to mortgages, 
meaning that ownership remains with the mortgagor. Patterson and 
the Ingersolls contend that Utah Law applies this same theory of 
mortgages to trust deeds. In Bybee v, Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 
P.2d 118 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah was a 
lien state in a case involving a mortgage. The court agreed with 
this lien theory even in the face of Sec. 78-1-13, U.C.A. 1943 
which the court quoted: 
. . . such mortgage when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance of the land therein des-
cribed, together with all the rights, privileges, and ap-
purtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his 
heirs, assigns and legal representatives, as security for 
the payment of the indentedness. . . .(emphasis in orig-
inal. ) 
It is interesting to compare the language of the above-quoted 
statute with that of UCA 57-1-20 (quoted supra., p 10). The 
language is quite similar in that both the conveyance of the 
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interest is given as security. 
It is readily apparent that the court reasoned that a lien 
theory is preferable to a title theory because the former theory 
does not enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession 
of the real property without a foreclosure sale. 
Applying this theory to the present case, it would appear 
that if a title theory were applied to a trust deed a situation 
would arise that the court in the Bybee case, supra, was trying 
to avoid. That situation being that if ownership was passed to 
the trustee when the trust deed was created, the trustee could 
take the position of an owner and obtain possession of the land 
without following the proper procedure for forclosure on the deed 
of trust. 
Futher, to assert that ownership of the property passed to 
the trustee upon execution of the deed of trust would mean that 
when Salt Lake City vacated the street to the owners of the 
adjoining property, the trustee received such ownership of the 
vacated property. And, if the trustors paid off: the obligation 
owed on the deed of trust, the trustee would still own the 
vacated property and as such, would receive a windfall through 
acting as trustee. Such a scenario is absurd and could not be 
contemplated by any rational reasoning. 
Because the trustee received only a security interest in the 
property of the trust deed, Patterson and the Ingersolls had 
ownership of the vacated street property. The facts of the case 
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plainly show that neither Patterson nor the Ingersolls ever 
deeded this property to anyone else and therefore/ they are still 
the owners of the property. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
1. Patterson and the Ingersolls have shown that they are 
entilted to prevail on their appeal. URCP 56 mandates that in 
order for summary judgment to have been properly entered against 
Patterson and the Ingersolls, there must have been no genuine 
issue of fact and Interstate was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Appellants Patterson and the Ingersolls have established 
a genuine issue of fact and further, that they are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
2. On review, this Court should consider all the facts in 
the light most favorable to Patterson and the Ingersolls. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that on review, a party against whom 
summary judgment has been granted is entitled to the benefit of 
having the court consider all of the facts presented, and every 
inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light most favorable 
to him. See, Morris v. Farnsworth Hotel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 
297 (1953). When this Court uses the above stated standard in 
considering the present appeal, it is apparent that the holding 
of the trial court must be overruled. 
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Dated this ^ -fur\ day of January, 1988. 
Ronald C. 
David C. Cundick, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused 4 copies of the 
foregoing to be hand-delivered this pL^ / C J L \ daY o f January, 
1987, pursuant to Rule 26(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
to: Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq., VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy, 50 South Main Street #1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84144. 
David C. CundicK 
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ADDENDUM 
A. EXHIBITS 
Memorandum Opinions and Order 
Exhibit "a" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. C 85-790 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. D. PATTERSON 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the court on the motions of 
defendant R. D. Patterson and proposed Intervenors to correct 
previous orders. The motions are expressly premised on Rules 
59(a)(6) and (7), 59(d), 59(e), 60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other 
applicable rules" and are directed at the following orders: 
1. Order Denying Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E. 
Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, 
and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, dated September 4, 198 6 
(hereinafter referred to as the "order denying 
intervention"). 
2. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Defendant, dated September 4, 1986 (hereinafter 
referred to as "summary judgment order"). 
The motions in question are contained in a single pleading 
dated September 13, 1986 and filed on September 15, 1986. It 
0 out?1 
INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON PAGE TWO OPINION AND ORDER 
was plaintiff, however, that caused the motions to be heard by 
the court on October 20, 1986, by its filing of a Notice of 
Hearing. 
The court heard the arguments of counsel on October 20, 
1986, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and took the matter under advisement* 
Thereafter, the court reviewed the entire file, including 
specifically the plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting papers, the original Motion to Intervene and 
Proposed Complaint in Intervention and the transcript of the 
hearing of May 5, 1986 on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and proposed Intervenors' Motion to Intervene 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the original motions"). 
The following procedural facts are significant: 
1. The original motions were fully presented to the court 
and argued on May 5, 1986. No legal memoranda, brief or 
evidence were submitted by the defendant or the proposed 
Intervenors. At that hearing, counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors proposed to submit a post hearing memorandum 
(Tr. p. 13) but none was forthcoming. 
2. The court, per Judge Fishier, took the matter under 
advisement and thereafter issued his ruling by means of a 
minute entry dated July 28, 1986. 
3. Proposed written orders incorporating the court's ruling 
were mailed by plaintiff to opposing counsel on August 1, 
1986. Defendant and proposed Intervenors did not object to 
30U178 
TNTERRTATT' V PATTERSON PAGE THREE OPINION AND ORDER 
t h e forin o r s u b s t a n c e of t h e s e p r o p o s e d o r d e r s . T h e r e a f t e r , 
i in s -- , 1:1 1 = 01 de r ciei ij i i ig j n t e r e:i i t i ::: i :t a i id t: 
summary judgment o r :e:i::i we re e n t e r e d by t h e cour t , p e r J u d g e . 
Danie l" . Tudqn F i s h i e r h a v i n g p r e v i o u s l y
 I e s i g n e d h i s 
p o s i t i o n on t in. count-, 
1 The t e n t h day t o l l o w i n g e n t r y of t h e summary udgment 
o r d e r ff-1 1 N'PPKPT'HI M> l 1U fend.1'si f . ". i1 
c h a l l e n g i in i MM B-unniihi jr*y judgment o r d e r on S e p t e m b e r 
1986 , t h e n e x t s i i r ceod i n< i d,i, whirh was nut" i ^ e > e r r -* 
l e g a l h o l i d a y i nil i i|uenl .1
 ( , i I i1 i n In i n o l i n n * . t > ; 
under Ru le 5 9 , U . R . C . P . , t h e y were t i m e l y f i l e d u r : e : P u l e 
ine p r i m a r y i s s u ~ ~-~«-~ r4-0 i - , ^ r t h e m o t i o n s i n 
g u e s t ion r- -e t r u l y Rule 5- ne r* ;o lu t . ion of t h i s i s s u e 
imparl!;".» ini,ill ill I j,11 I In 
but, more significantly *;nal:ty o: tne judgmert »r "roes" ion 
rtiifl t h u s 1 hip t n n o l i i < - -rre-m" ~ *• - ~ * 
Utah I or t Mr riMMi . * . :* w '--.^  
motions as not properlv filed under K le 5 
The ini"it; i onr. 11 itiost,, i on ar o 
5 9 ( a ) ( 6 ) and (7) and 5 9 ( d ) , Each of t h e s e s u b d i v i s i o n * « ^ i e s s i y 
r e f e r e n c e ' ri "new t r i a l i I he c o n t e m p l a t e d r e l i e f . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y a r e a p p l i c a b l e < 11 h a s ( i roeeded 
t h e n o t i o n . In summary "judgment p r o c e e d i n g s no t r i a l t a L t b p l a c e 
and i n iiO'i 'oi IJ .LSI  ic i i i in 1 l i Hi nil II "i""" ••• -• 1 1 1 , ! i n i l i n i v - mi I i i i n I  ni l" 1 1 H I 2 
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unnecessary. Thus, a challenge to the entry of the summary 
judgment order cannot be premised on subdivisions (a) or (d) of 
Rule 59. Additionally, Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to the summary 
judgment proceedings. 
The remaining question under Rule 59 is whether subdivision 
(e) is a proper vehicle to challenge the rendering of a summary 
judgment. Depending on the resolution of this remaining 
question, a further issue may be whether Rule 59(e) is 
appropriate to challenge a summary judgment when no new evidence, 
fact or even legal argument is presented in support of the Rule 
59(e) motion. 
Rule 59(e), which is identical to Rule 59(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, has been a part of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure from their inception. Rule 59(e) was, however, 
an addition to the federal rules in the 1946 amendments. The 
Advisory Committee Notes to the federal rules indicate that 
subdivision (e) was M... added to care for a situation such as 
that arising in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, ... 146 
F.2d 321 [(8th Cir. 1944)] and makes clear that the district 
court possesses the power asserted in that case to alter or amend 
a judgment after its entry.11 In Boaz the court held that the 
district court had inherent power to amend a judgment of 
dismissal without prejudice to a judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice. While such power of amendment inheires in the court 
rendering the judgment, the use of Rule 59(e) for amendment of 
I N T E K S T A T I ' V" I ' A T T K l ' " ' ! ^ PM1E I1"""! , I«: OPINION i i n '^MIIR 
T in 1'imont i*' a p p l i e d In in ^ e r y l i m i t e d s i t u a t i o n s such ar t h o s e 
(ii anenteiJ IIIIIII Boaz . I III • A d v i s o r y Loinin J t t e t N o t e s themseJ upes Mm; 
* iK|<|i>i t t h a t Rule «SQ(P) was not i n t e n d e d to i t h e w h o l e s a l e 
C h i l l J u ' M H ' ' ' ' ' J l 7 ! 1 ' n ^ 'Li (11 i n I I 11 il i i i i f i i i Q J i ' i i I II II t ' i i > 
n o t a p p l y , 
1 in the i n s t a n t i t* In Ru 1 e 59 (e ) mot i nn di ie? p o s e a 
w h o l e s a l e a t t a c k on t h e summary judgment u i d e i , While I ajL at. a 
P u l e 59 m o t i o n , i t i*- in f a c t a m o t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r . T h e r e a r e 
win liinis K|H r i ( n i in Ih i wliii In in I Inn in patf | 1 MI i i HI I i p r n i v i rir r a -
t i o n f o l l o w i n g a t r i a l , I lies 5 0 ( b ) , 52(b) and Kule 5 9 , U . k , i", P . 
The l o g i c a l p l a r o f o r a c i p > " i r ' > '»> upon which t o p r e m i s e a 
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ul a summary judgment uoiild In IIIIIII I nihil i ion 
o i R u l e 5 6 , No such r u l e , however , e x i s t s , 
Pi nil i MI i MI i ul nil i kp i i i u , iiiiiiJ t>\ i > i f l e iiicehaiiiaiii In L L c r i j L * i d e r 
a f i n a l j u d g m e n t , s u c h a s t h o s e p r e s c r i b e d in Ru le s b 0 ( b ) , bz {(b) 
a n c j ^y^ JLb n e c e s s n v fin 11M I a mot ion f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n c a n 
•stay t h e r u n n i n g o! Ui 1 h H d i I i I • it ) u t n < \t \ . " ] o 
a l l ow Ru le 5 , :He) t n I f used a i c a t c h a l l mean In se< I 
rec: i n| an I in I iindqmenit m e r e l y p r o v i d e ^ i moans t o 
c h a l l e n g e t in i n t e g r i t y and f i n a l if., I 'I i s e o m t 1 udgments 
and a l l o w s t h e moving p a r t y fu i t fn i t ime w i t h i n whnii t n f i l e an 
a p p e a l . 
Thi a r r numerous t h r e s h o l d s i n sumrary j u d g m e n t 
j rr i f»pr1 ini'i in whiMh i f a r t y n p p o s i n q t - - mo^<^n r-*-r -^ - e a r d . 
Q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , t h e p a i t y IIUJ siihiml \\\ ; 
i\i 
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and briefs and be heard at oral argument. Following any hearing 
and while the court has the matter under advisement, the party 
opposing the motion may make further submissions. Even if the 
matter is not taken under advisement, a signed judgment is always 
necessary under Rule 58A. Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules 
of Practice requires service of a proposed judgment on opposing 
counsel and allows five days for objection. Only then can the 
final judgment be entered. Thus# Rule 2.9 provides the opposing 
party with an opportunity by means of objection to convince the 
court that its previously ruling was erroneous. No further 
mechanism for reconsideration is necessary or desirable. 
The instant case is illustrative. The plaintiff originally 
presented this matter to the court on May 5, 1986, in a hearing 
on its Motion for Summary Judgment. Defense counsel had the 
opportunity to file papers, memoranda, and affidavits in 
opposition. No such items were filed. Counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors filed a Motion to Intervene and a Proposed Complaint 
in Intervention. At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, defense counsel and counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors were heard. 
The court thereafter had the matter under advisement for 
over two months during which time defendants and the proposed 
Intervenors made no filings or submissions. While counsel for 
the proposed Intervenors did propose to file a post hearing 
memorandum (Tr. p. 13)# none was forthcoming. It is particularly 
GG01S3 
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significant that at u tame have r^ndant , : th- ropcsed 
I n t e l v e i i t i r ul ini i I I i 11 d f 1 i 
issue of material fait, Following tat ntJ i\« e ei.i : ^ .,: ~, 
l^Rfi, wh u ii was mailed to d u •* M ^ r" nei+ Her ^ f ^ d r * * -** 
proposed Interveners reqiiesl Il this cout !:: : ire cons i dvi i I s 
ruling. Moreover, no objections In the proposed judgment 
suJbm i t led iiy }i la int i f 1 *s eon rise I wei c i rite rposed under Kul e ,•' , 9 
of the District Court Rules of Practice. 
Defendant and the proposed Interveners now, however' seek to 
have this court reconsider its tinal judgment hy noeani;., „»! JILS 
Rule 59 motions. At the hearing of October 20, 1986, counsel for 
nit ieiiddnt and :i ntf rvenoiTi ddnill t.r-.l I: I rrrf ,i ,| f hnl I hei < w a s 
nothing before the court, including new legal arguments, tl'iat had 
not previour.1v been submitted and argued .Pit' the May S hearing on 
the original motions. J."fn; '.inly I h i m j d ± 1, i e i v 111! WI,H.I I I M I I lieie 
was a new judge linJin:1 Fishier having, resigned before the formal-
e n t r*,' Il I Hi 11 i I; I n iiirifTinent . 
The courts which have addressed the issue are split, some' 
holding that Rule 59(e) is not, a proper vehicle to challenge a 
su ium J t y in iiiiiiLiijHieiiil, inn I o tJ i ie i ; \> In i.l d l nci I I In nit: i ii r / . E . g . , 
compare Blair v. Delta Air Lines., Inc. 3 44 f S upp., \»"i«7 (S. D. 
Fli 10 ' ] I ind Purkin v, Taylor,, 4,4 4 F. Supp. 879, 88 9-i:*0 IE, D. 
Va , 19 i 7 | with Sidney-Vinstein v. A. H Robii is Co.
 f 69 ; If '. 2 :I 
88 0, 8RC) f9t,h c, i ir 1983) and Stephenson v. Calpine Con i fers II
 f 
L t d . , (•!' i," II ' i I 11 I r ' f -I ) See also J etero Constr. Co. 
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V °_outh Memphis Lumber Co. . 531 F. 2d 1348, 1351-52 (6th Cir. 
1976). 
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray Citv, 590 P. 2d 309, 
310-311 (Utah 1979) addresses the issue from the standpoint of a 
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus. To that extent it 
is instructive but not controlling in the context of a summary 
judgment. In the latter context many more opportunities are 
generally available for parties and advocates to present 
argument. Parties opposing summary judgment are also generally 
presented an opportunity by means of objections under Rule 2.9 to 
convince the court prior to entry of judgment that its ruling was 
erroneous. 
Even if Rule 59(e) was generally deemed a proper mechanism 
to challenge a summary judgment, it should not be deemed a proper 
use of such mechanism when no new fact, piece of evidence or even 
legal argument is presented in support of a Rule 59(e) motion or 
when a party opposing summary judgment fails to object to a 
proposed judgment under Rule 2.9. Under such circumstances, the 
party opposing summary judgment should pursue their remedy by 
appeal rather than a motion for reconsideration under the guise 
of Rule 59(e). 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Rule 59 motions 
are denied as being improperly premised on Rule 59. Proposed 
Intervenors1 motion for reconsideration cannot even be deemed to 
be premised on Rule 59 since they were not parties to the 
GG0184 
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p r o c e e d ' " * •»:" *-y judqi ient v*° i r a ^ t i - * K P -* * r * i s 
m a t t e r *. . . ppea . . . md t h i s cui 
i n t i f f irsiaht be a b i e t v a v o i d some e l t e a d d i t i o n a l - e l i * by 
- sj«i , : 11 11 HI IT * •>. 
g r o u n d s i: . .\ -:*** n o t i c e of a p p e a l was t i x e c k u t ,.,; ... t> a a > s 
f o l l o w i n g j u d g m e n t ., 
B e c a u s e t h e Utah Supreme Cour t i .,..i;u o.sdyr^. . . . ^ ws 
f * p r e s s e d h e r e i n and t o a v o i d any p o s s i b l e remand s o l e l y f o r t h i s 
i (1111 I I 11 mi i i i ) n s I el e r 11 s n J d q m #"J n 1 p n i • * - - :* e 
59 m o t i o n s , the c o u r t hai. c o n s i d e r e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d and f i n d s 
TUN m a n i f e s t e r r o r u n d e r ] y i n q t h e o r d e r s e n t e r e d cm S e p t e m b e r 4 , 
J Jilt). The coin I p i r t i c th la i J y m I * I I i< 11 ill I r i I y I llhoen 
p r e s e n t e d w i t h any mati ct Ihy d e f e n d a n t or o t h e r w i s e wh ich t e n d s 
I 11 r 11 *w iniMini I iin' i s s u e nil m a t e r i a l f ac t F a t h e s e r e a s o n s , 
even i f d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n s s h o u l d be deemed p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d 
u n d e r Ru le 5% 1 In1 ruc t ions a r e d e n i e d . 
The i iiui I I iii I hi!1! ijciiii'ii dofeiMJdiniil " > III it ion mult i I u h i> ii(h) 
f o r t h e r e a s o n tha i i t is a mot ion tn r e c o n s i d e r aril i s n o t 
p r o p e r l y p r e m i s e d *V i rounds c p r ^ i fif* l! i r P u l e fiO'J See 
13 J a i r v . D e l t a A n L i n e s , I n c . i i i I uj j li ' i n I I JJ , 
J fW 2 1 . The on ly s u r p r i s e t h a t h a s been a s s e r t e d was e x p r e s s l y 
a s s e r t e d ill Il I i III! " I U'i I in \\ IIH| i i i linii mrjnth' | r e c e d i n g 
t h e f i l i n g of t h e s e mot ion mil no fu i th t j i memorandum i-as f i l e d 
a f t e r t h e Miy ^ h o a r m q a s p r o m i s e d . 
I t iu ILhetelnii o r d e r e d , ill |inlr|i il ml ilc w \ I HI limit 
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defendant's and proposed Interveners' motions under Rule 59(a)(6) 
and (7), 59(d), 59(e)# 60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other applicable 
rules" are hereby denied. 
DATED THIS 2nd day of December, 1986. 
_______ MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
/"'" '"b^ utyCtari/ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Patrick O'Hara, Esq. 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Ralph J. Hafen, Esq. 
402 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
This y?w day of December, 1986. 
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David B. Boyce 
of BACKMAN, C L A M U MARSH 
Attorneys for Interveners 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1 
Telephone 531-8300 
IN T H E DISTRICT COURT 
STAT 
* * * * * 
SALT LA! I"- I, 
Plaintiff, 
vs , 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO. 
Defendant. 
LEilEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E. 
INGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL, 
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL, 
EVELYN E, INGERSOLL, his wift , 
Interveners, 
vs 
-•iGUNwM., FUEL SUPPLY CO. and 
-'ALT ; U-:E CITY 
ndant and 
* * * * * * 
Come now f *-
 ( imervener^ and for cause of ac11 on 
agains*- rk» Plaintiff a c Pefendant pitac am allege a^ follows: 
Ir Interveners ai ti.i owners c certa: real 
L A K £ U O U N T Y 
vJVINT 
Civi l No, 78-7764 
p rope-
Brew* "1.5 
proft . : 
sub. • i -
Hr fwrr ; Mr 
j u t * 
n. ».u nan., a i a i L c i n i i ; u i 
a i u r ^ :t tnar'e** of *-*'•-: a c t i o n . 
, . as the 
real 
d 
uLjwCt matter real property consists of 
First South St:<-*c*. aid Glendale Street and those portions more 
particularly described in Plaintiff's complaint. 
3. That at some time prior to October 15, 1977, the 
Defendant petitioned the Plaintiff for passage of ordinances 
that would vacate certain portions of those streets as dedicated 
public thoroughfares. 
4. That in August or September, 1977, the Defendant, 
by and through its authorized agent, contacted Melvin E. 
Ingersoll and inquired of him whether the Interveners objected 
to ordinances vacating First South Street west of 1100 West and 
that portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street and 
First South Street between 10th and 11th West, 
5. That Melvin E. Ingersoll informed the Defendant's 
agent that Interveners had no reason to want the aforementioned 
vacation, and would strongly oppose any attempt to vacate First 
South Street between 10th and 11th West. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Interveners incorporate by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 of Interveners1 amended complaint. 
7. That because of the Interveners' objection to the 
proposed vacation by the Defendant, Melvin E. Ingersoll and the 
Defendant's agent agreed that they would both determine the 
possibilities of having the Plaintiff or others construct certain 
overpasses over the railroad and an off ramp from the freeway 
to provide additional access to the Brewery Mall in exchange for 
an agreement by the Interveners that they would sign the petition 
for the vacation of First South Street west of 1100 West and that 
portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street. Melvin E. 
Ingersoll also agreed that if the overpasses and off ramp were 
acquired, that Interveners would not object to the petition to 
vacate First South Street between 10th and 11th West. That 
Defendant agreed not to petition for the vacation of First South 
-2-
Street between 10th and 11th West until f.W possibilities for 
the oft ramp anil overpasses were determint , and agr ' to give 
the interveners actual notice of any attempt Lo petition loi the 
vacation of First, South between 10th and llch Went., 
Hi That t'he Defendant breai. Utd tiaid agreement by 
petitioning the Plaintift t'oi* the vacation of First South between 
10th and llLh West prior to at tempting to obtain the overpasses 
and off ramp and without giving notice to the Interveners, or 
any of them. 
n
 ™-—
 ; ....rsuant to the neti-. i, el i.^ Defendant 
the Plaintitt enacted an ordinance vacating First Sourr. *~ *» *-• 
10th an, . L* i^ * Lo the damage ai derri..- : - v - > 
1.. -:.at the Interveners ^au^tw remedy 
at law. 
II That L Lie agreement between the Defendant and 
Interveners should he specifically enforced to gi\,tj the parties 
an opportunity to determine if the overpasses and off ramp can 
he acquired and to give the Interveners the right lo timely 
object, lo the petition to vacate First South between 10th ,nnl 
11th West and Lo rescind their consent to the othe' peti'. i ,»u. 
1,2 That, Lite Plaintiff has already determined th.it 
there is not good cause for said vacation and th.it such vacation, 
would be detrimental Co f hi' M H I nt i f t „ the Interveners and the 
public in general. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
I terveners incorporate by reference the allegations 
contaiLc . paragraphs 1 through 12 of Intervener:, amended 
complain; . 
<. : o D t : ] ' Del en * S 
agent requested Mei\ lngersc t-* ' 
the vacatiwi* ci F^L^L auutn * e* « .dt 
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portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street. 
15. That the Defendants agent failed to disclose 
to Melvin E. Ingersoll that Defendant was pursuing and intended 
to pursue its petition to vacate that portion of First South 
Street between 10th and 11th West. 
16. That Interveners executed the petition on the 
assumption that Defendant would not and was not petitioning or 
pursuing its petition for the vacation of First South Street 
between 10th and 11th West. 
17. That the omission of the Defendant constituted 
a misrepresentation concerning a presently existing material 
fact which falsely deceived the Interveners into signing the 
petition and the defendant knew that it did so and that 
Interveners would not have signed the petition with knowledge 
of Defendant's intention and the omission was done for the 
purpose of inducing the Interveners to sign the petition and 
the Interveners acted reasonably and in ignorance of the 
Defendant's intent and relied upon the information given with 
the understanding that there was no intent to attempt to vacate 
First South Street between 10th and 11th West. 
18. That as a result of the omission, the Interveners 
have been damaged. 
19. That Interveners have no adequate remedy at law. 
20. That Interveners should now be given an opportunity 
to present their objections to the petition that resulted in the 
ordinance vacating that portion of First South Street between 
10th and 11th West and said objections should be considered to 
be timely and the ordinances should be set aside. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
21. Interveners incorporate by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 of Interveners' amended 
complaint. 
-4-
2* .^ ' t.r?e premise-- r.j.^i.- . *-i ,.* * as set 
forth ir, par-j^ra,.^ . • . * - a::*, o* iomi-iaint were oiadt 
- . . >.-- ..* , r* :<•* h;,oulJ reasonably have expected 
.:;;.. i *• - :g.iaLu:v> o! tr.e I 'iter vene rt •"- C*u.- e Lit ion 
: - : : *-.t : -.^natures and forbearance by the interveners 
loosing the other p e t i t e * 
2: *'•*_ d'jo.i. described promises di < 
induce such action ar-J forbearance 
1- lnar r;.t- prorrises r.'«rav , - f 
a existing tig:: ,** trt- :« :e* '-< 
25 , i- *: ^ * t a . *^:'j uy enforcing i\t 
promist •• " ~-~ :, . --_ . iiig aside trt ordnances * -tat 
vj.a** '..„ : ,vv • revert* and g^vin^ :: interveners an 
Oj'poi *d,* *: • f- timely present their objections t tre vacations. 
2f * : c Defendant should -?*; . ^ toppe ' fr . JL*. . . ^ 
any right tii.it ; ,.ieze,: . . .t sub]ec ma h ;u : " . 
Interveners incorporate by reference L;>e allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 t:«:ough b or Interveners' amenaed 
• complaint, 
1 .oi'.r ff e n ^ U :,. ..,.*,. es 
vacating First S- ,r .t f r -.-  - *---c<-. * > • r l *t-,t a:,, First 
South Street wes* ,- A portion -- Ueridaiv 
Street r.— 
acat^or. «. *2^  •*"*• 
. . ,w ^  ., i - .* x : t- < w : he i - * -\> public benefit 
from said vacation and said vacation is detrimental to the 
general interest of the public. 
fie de ci s i ' • ; l: e ha:r f:f:
 : ,, k. J 
ordinances wa- s,one arbitrarily and ,J? . . , , - ion 
rest.:-- i _.. -..wabion 
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Interveners. That said vacations were done at the insistence 
of the Defendant and the Defendant knew that the Plaintiff was 
acting under the assumption of information that was, in fact, 
erroneous, namely, that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the 
underlying fee title to the subject matter property. 
31. That said vacations were done without giving the 
Interveners notice and an opportunity to be heard and said 
vacations have damaged the Interveners. 
32. That the Interveners have been specifically damaged 
by said vacations. 
33. That the Interveners do not have an adequate 
remedy at law. 
34. That said vacations should be set aside. 
WHEREFORE, Interveners pray judgment against the 
Defendant as follows: 
1. For a judgment setting aside the ordinances that 
were enacted by the Plaintiff that vacated First South Street west 
of 1100 West and that portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South 
Street and 1st South Street between 10th and 11th West. 
2. For an injunction enjoining the Defendant permanently 
from interfering with the subject matter property and the use 
thereof by the public as a public thoroughfare. 
3. For a judgment specifically enforcing the agreement 
between the Defendant and the Interveners and giving the Interveners 
the right to timely present their objections to said vacations to 
the Plaintiff and giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to timely 
re-examine whether the subject matter property should be vacated. 
4. For judgment against the Defendant enforcing the 
promises of the Defendant and estopping Defendant from claiming 
any right, title or interest in the subject matter real property. 
5. Alternatively, for judgment for damages in an amount 
-6-
to be determined as a result of the acts, conduct and omissions 
of the Defendant as set forth herein. 
6. For costs of Court and any other relief the Court 
deems just in the premises. 
Against the Plaintiff, Salt Lake City, as follows: 
1. For judgment setting aside the vacation ordinances. 
2. Alternatively, for judgment for damages in an amount 
to be determined as a result of the acts, conduct and omissions 
of the Plaintiff as set forth herein. 
3. For costs of Court and any other relief the Court 
deems just in the premises. 
Dated this 3>Q day of A y t t l , 1979. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
UbJuL S. <^t-
David B. Boyce 
Attorneys for Interveners 
500 American Savings Builc 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ Q day of — — j - — 
1979, a copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed, postage 
prepaid, as follows: 
James S. Lowrie 
Thomas E. K. Cerruti 
JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K & McDONALD 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
R. D. PATTERSON, 
Defendant. 
C85-0790 
Judge Phillip R. Fishier 
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL, MARIAN 
BEVERLY INGERSOLL, LELAND R. 
INGERSOLL and EVELYN E. 
INTERSOLL, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention, 
vs* 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, 
and R. D. PATTERSON, 
Defendants in Intervention, 
ooOoo 
Plaintiffs in intervention, herein referred to collectively 
as ("INGERSOLLS"), answer the allegations in the main complaint 
herein so far as they relate to the disputed property described 
below, and complain and allege as follows: 
INTERVENORS' ANSWER TO INTERSTATE'S COMPLAINT 
Intervenors answer the complaint of Interstate Land Corpora-
tion ("INTERSTATE") on file herein by admitting, denying and 
alleging as follows: 
PIRST DEFENSE 
(Failure to State Claim) 
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief upon 
which relief may be granted. Among other things, plaintiff has 
failed to allege that plaintiff's "predecessor or grantor" was 
"seized or possessed of the property in question within seven 
years" as required by 78-12-5, 78-12-6, et seq.r OCA, 1953. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
(Patterson & Ingersolls1 Title by Adverse Possession) 
Each of the four Ingersolls are the owner of an undivided 1/5 
interest and defendant R. D. Patterson ("PATTERSON") is the owner 
of an undivided 1/5 interest in and to said property. At all 
time from and after October, 1977, Ingersolls and Patterson have 
been in actual physical possession of and have visibly, openly, 
notoriously, continuously possessed and used the disputed 
property under a claim of title and ownership thereto, which 
claim has at all times been hostile and adverse to the claims of 
all persons and organization, including the claims of Interstate 
and of the persons and organizations through whom Interstate 
claims to have derived its title. The disputed property has been 
disposed of by Salt Lake City within the meaning of 78-12-13, 
UCA, 1953. Ingersolls and Patterson have been in "the exclusive, 
continuous and adverse possession of such real estate" for "more 
than seven years subsequent to such conveyance" and are "purchas-
ers" within the meaning of said statute. Accordingly, Ingersolls 
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and Patterson have acquired "adverse title" to the disputed 
property as provided therein. In the alternative, Ingersolls and 
Patterson have acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse 
possession as provided in 78-12-7, 78-12-7.1, 78-12-8, 78-12-9, 
78-12-10, 78-12-11, 78-12-12, 78-12-21.1, 78-12-16, 78-12-17 and 
other applicable statutes pertaining to acquisition of title to 
real property by adverse possession. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
(Statutory Time Bar to Plaintiff's Claims) 
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the provisions of 78-12-5, 
78-12-5.1,78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3, 78-12-6, 78-12-7, 78-12-8, 
78-12-9, 78-12-10, 78-12-11, UCA, 1953, and other applicble 
statuts of limitations. Among other things plaintiff's claim is 
barred under those statutes since neither plaintiff nor the 
persons or organizations through whom it claims to have acquired 
title have been in possession of the disputed property within 
seven years prior to commencement of this action (or at all). 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
(Waiver and Estoppel) 
Plaintiff has by its acts and/or omissions (and those of its 
predecessors in alleged title) waived any claim that they may 
have had to the disputed property and/or are now estopped to 
assert said claims. Among other things plaintiff's predecessor 
in alleged title did not ask for or received a trust deed or 
other security with respect to the disputed property, and as-
- 3 -
serted no claim to the disputed property when it caused the 
notice of default under the trust deed to be recorded. See 
allegations in ! 9 and 11 below. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
(Response to Complaint) 
Answering the numbered paragraphs of plaintiff's complaintf 
intervenors admit, deny and allege as follows: 
1. Admit allegations in % 1 and 2. 
2. Admit allegations in 1 3, except deny that said property 
(herein referred to as the "Disputed Property") is "plaintiff's 
real property"; allege affirmatively that plaintiff has no 
right, title or interest thereon; and that Ingersolls and 
Patterson are the owners of said property as appears more fully 
in the complaint in intervention (below). 
3. Deny allegations in K 4. Allege affirmatively that 
plaintiff has no rightf title or interest in and to said property 
as appears more fully in the complaint in intervention (below). 
4. Admit allegations in X 5. Allege affirmatively that both 
defendant Patterson and defendants Ingersolls are in possession 
of said property and claim ownership thereof. 
5. Deny allegations in H 6 and all other allegations in 
plaintiff's complaint not specifically admitted herein. 
- 4 -
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Quiet Title) 
6. The main action herein is a quiet-title lawsuit seeking 
to determine ownership of a disputed parcel of real property 
("DISPUTED PROPERTY") located in Salt Lake County, Utah, which 
premies are described: 
(a) in exhibit "A" to the complaint of plaintiff Interstate 
Land Corporation ("INTERSTATE"), 
(b) in the quit-claim deed of July 27, 1979 from Lemel 
Corporation ("LEMEL") to defendant R. D. Patterson ("PATTERSON"), 
a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit "I", 
(c) as parcels #8 and 9 in the Trustees Deed of June 3, 1982 
from NACM International ("NACM") to General Brewing Company 
("GENERAL BREWING"), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
exhibit "II", and are 
(d) also shown in the plot map attached as exhibit "C" to 
the affidavit of Raymond L. Griffith filed herein, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as exhibit "III". 
7. The disputed property was the West half of Glendale and 
the South half of First South Streets, West of 1100 West in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, as vacated by the City of Salt Lake by an 
ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 
Utah on October 5, 1977, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
exhibit "IV" (see also plot map, exhibit "III" hereto). 
8. At the time that said streets were vacated each of the 
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four Ingersolls (plaintiffs in intervention) were the owners of 
an undivided 1/5 and and Lemel was the owner o£ an undivided 1/5 
of the real property abutting ("ABUTTING PROPERTY") the disputed 
property. By operation of law when said streets were vacated fee 
title to an undivided 1/5 of the disputed property reverted to 
and vested in each of the four Ingersolls and Lemel. Lemel 
thereafter conveyed its undivided 1/5 ownership interest in and 
to the disputed property to Patterson by a quit-claim deed, 
exhibit "I" hereto. 
9. The abutting property was pledged by Ingersolls and Lemel 
as security for an obligation owed by them to General Brewing by 
a trust deed executed in July, 1977, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as exhibit "V". The disputed property was not pledged as 
security for said debt by said trust deed. 
10. After acqisition of title to the disputed property (May, 
1980) Ingersolls conveyed their interest in the abutting property 
to Lemel by quit-claim deed, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as exhibit "VI", and Lemel thereupon became owner of 100% of the 
abutting property. Ingersolls did not convey the disputed 
property to Lemel. 
11. Lemel failed to pay the obligation secured by the trust 
deed (exhibit "V") and General Brewing caused a notice of default 
of said trust deed to be filed about September, 1979, a copy of 
which is attached as exhibit "VII". In said notice of default 
General Brewing asserted no claim to the disputed property. 
12. Thereafter Lemel filed a petition in bankruptcy in the 
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United States District Court for the District of Utahf Central 
Division, case No. 80-00755. The disputed property was not 
listed as an asset of Leroel in the bankruptcy. 
13. In that bankruptcy NACM was appointed as trustee of 
Leroel. By a "Trustees Deed" (exhibit "II" hereto) NACM sold and 
conveyed the abutting property (parcels #1 thru 7) and purported 
to sell the disputed property (parcels #8 and 9) to General 
Brewing. 
14. General Brewing purported to convey the disputed prop-
erty to Interstate by a special warranty deedf a copy of which is 
attached as exhibit "VIII". 
15. Since Leroel did not have title to the disputed property 
exhibit "II" conveyed nothing to General Brewing and the deed 
froro General Brewing to Interstate (exhibit "VIII") conveyed 
nothing to Interestate. However, said deeds cloud the title to 
Ingersolls and Patterson to the disputed property. The Court 
should quiet title to a 1/5 interest in and to the disputed 
property in the naroes of each of the Ingersolls and Patterson, 
and declare that Interstate has no right, title or interest 
therein. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Adverse Possession) 
16. Intervenors incorporate herein by reference thereto all 
of the allegations contained in 1 6 thru 15 above. 
17. At all time froro and after October, 1977, Ingersolls and 
Patterson have been in actual physical possession of and have 
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visibly, openly, notoriously, continuously possessed and used the 
disputed property under a claim of title and ownership thereto, 
which claim has at all tiroes been hostile and adverse to the 
claims of all persons and organization, including the claims of 
Interstate and of the persons and organizations through whom 
Interstate claims to have derived its title. 
18. The disputed property has been disposed of by Salt Lake 
City within the meaning of 78-12-13, UCA, 1953. Ingersolls and 
Patterson have been in "the exclusive, continuous and adverse 
possession of such real estate" for "more than seven years 
subsequent to such conveyance" and are "purchasers" within the 
meaning of said statute. Accordingly, Ingersolls and Patterson 
have acquired "adverse title" to the disputed property as 
provided therein. In the alternative, Ingersolls and Patterson 
have acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse possession 
as provided in 78-12-7, 78-12-7.1, 78-12-8, 78-12-9, 78-12-10, 
78-12-11, 78-12-12, 78-12-21.1, 78-12-16, 78-12-17 and other 
applicable statutes pertaining to acquisition of title to real 
property by adverse possession. 
WHEREFORE, Ingersolls as intervenors pray for judgment as 
follows: 
19. Quieting title to a 1/5 undivided interest in and to the 
disputed property in the names of Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian 
Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, Evelyn E. Ingersoll and 
R. D. Patterson against the claims of Interstate and of all 
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persons or organizations claiming by, under or through Inter-
state. 
20. For such damages as the Court determines to have been 
sustained by intervenors as a proximate result of the improper 
claims and acts of Interstate. 
21. For interest, costs, a reasonable attorney's fee and for 
such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
Dated the 3rd day of May, 1986. 
Ttonald C. Barker 
Attorney for Ingersolls 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, the 3rd day of May, 1986, to each of the 
following person at the addresses indicated: 
Patrick J. OfHara, Esq., P. 0. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145, and to Ralph J. Hafen, Esq., 402 Kearns Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101. 
Ronald C. Barker ^ -
- 9 -
SCHEDULE "A" 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, 
Block 1, JONES' SUBDIVISION, Block 54, Plat 
"C" Salt Lake City Survey, said point also 
being the Northwest corner of 1100 West and 
First South Streets; and running thence South 
0°2*53M East 132.17 feet; thence West 334.00 
feet; thence North 0°00'55" West 214.63 feet 
to the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, 
said JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence North 33°42' 
East 59.48 feet; thence East 36.00 feet to 
the Northwest corner of Lot 2, Block 1, said 
JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence South 132.00 feet; 
thence East 264.00 feet to the point of beg-
inning . 
P 0-' 
f 
1 ' , '
u 
SALT ifr. vOLSNTY RECORDER 
K A T I E U - D I X O N 
! ; nftRCH 19S2 
3b55732 QUl'i -ILAln L/EED 
TOTAL RECORD FEE fAlD &Y CASH f»tt!i.00 
THANK YOU - tOUfc DOCUnENT WILL BE 
RETURNED WHEN PROCESSING IS C0HFLETE 
/ 
<.*' \y'y 
S ^ ^ (&*d.. p.?.±l?.. 
3655782 
5' ^  |. ^v— 
Space Above foi^ liftorcLpr'i.Us "~ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED *~ 
[CORPORATE FORM] 
"O 
r*o 
j LEMEL CORPORATION
 f a corporation 
j organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
S a l t Lake C i t y , of County of S a l t Lake , State of Utah, 
j grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to 
: R.D. PATTERSON 
of Salt Lake County 
Ten and no/100 — - •--- — • — 
and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Sa l t Lake 
State of Utah: 
The West ha l f of Glendale and South half of 
F i r s t South S t r e e t s , west of 1100 West in 
Sa l t Lake City , Utah, as vacated by the 
City of Sa l t Lake by an ordinance passed 
by the Board of Commissioners of Sa l t Lake 
City , Utah on the 5th day of October, 1977 
and published on the 15th day of October, 
1977, the e n t i r e t y of sa id Glendale and 
F i r s t South S t r e e t s west of 1100 West being 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y described as fo l lows: 
(See Schedule HA,f at tached) 
grantee 
for the sum of 
" DOLLARS, 
County, 
i The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
I thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
; grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
! In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
I by its duly authorized officers this 27th day of J u l y , A. D. 1979 
Attest: 
Secreta 
[CORPORATE SEAL] 
! STATE OF UTAH, 
President. \ 
^ TRUSTEE'S DEED fYfZt-
3682*90 
THIS INDENTURE, Made this 3rd day of June, 1982, 
betveen NACM INTERMOUNTAIN, tha duly appointed, qualified and 
actJ eg Trustee of tha estate of LeMel Corporation, and 
GENirAL BREWING COMPANYJ 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, by an Order duly made and entered on the 27th 
day of May, 1982 by tha United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division, the Honorable Ralph R. 
Mabey, U. S. Bankruptcy Judge presiding, in proceedings then 
pending in said court entitled "In rat LeMel Corporation, 
Debtor* No. 80-00755, NACM Intermountain, in its capacity as 
Trustee of the estate in Bankruptcy of LeMel Corporation, was 
duly authorized and empowered to convey all of the right, .title 
and interest of LeMel Corporation, the Debtor, and all right, 
title and interest of the estate of the Debtor in the real 
property hereinafter described to General Brewing Company? 
and said court having determined that the requirements of Notice 
and hearing under Section 11 U.S.C. $363(b) have bsen net? 
NOW, THEREFORE, NACM Intermountain, in its capacity as 
Trustee of tha estate or LeMel Corporation, by virtue of the 
power and authority. In it, yes ted aa aforesaid, and In considera-
tion of the SUB of Ten and no/100 Dollars ($10*00) and other 
valuable consideration to it in hand paid by General Brewing 
Company, tha receipt of which ia heraby acknowledged, does hereby 
quit-claim and convey unto tha said General Brewing Caspany, g 
all of the right, titla and interest of LeMal Corporation and fj 
all of tha right, titla and intarast of tha estate in '.bankruptcy K 
of V\Mel Corporation, in and to that certain real property ., 3 , 
altutte, lyittg and being in tha County of Salt Lake, State of j$ 
s, certain ' Utah, aubject to two leases, each for.a term of years, certain * 4 
I S . * . " * » "1 ^Jfc-— o s o r t • 
EXHIBIT 
month-to-month tenancies, and certain interests, ri<jnts of 
way and «aaemente hereinafter deecrlb.d. but otherwise free 
and clear of all H e m and other interests, more particularly 
described as follows to witt 
all of Block *3, Flat »C, Salt Lake City Survey 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 43, flat 
*C", Salt Lake City Surrey and running thence fart 4 feetj 
thence South 660 feet; thence Vest 4 feet to the Southeast 
corner of Lot 1 of said Block 43? thence Worth 660 feet 
to the point of beginning* 
PAfCfL fO, 1; 
Beginning at the Southv*rt corner of said Block 43, and 
running thence Vest 99 <'*et; thence ltorth 2*7.5 feet; thecce 
Vest 163 f ee t , tore or l e s s , to the East bank of the Jordan 
Blver; thence Northerly along said East bsnk to a point 
due Vest froa the lorthwest corner of said Block 43; thtnee 
Esst to the Northwest corner of said Block *3» thence South 
660 feet to the point of beginning. 
All of the South ht l f of vacated First South Street lying 
between the Vest line of Glendale Street produced and the 
East Bank of the Jordan River. 
Cioncncing at the Southwest corner of Hook 44, flat *C*, 
Suit Lake City Survey, end running thence Worth 10 rodei 
thence Esst 10 rods: thonce South 10 rode; thence Vest 
10 rode to the point of beginning. 
a l l of Lot 3, Blook 1, JOKES S0BDZYZ320B of Blook 54, f l i t Z 
•C% Salt Uke City Survey. K 
Together v l t h the east h t l f of vacated Olendele Street co 
•dJoining on the Vest. g 
- i -
mciwuL-ii 
A l l of Lota 1 and 2 1 , f l o o k f, JOKIS SUBDXfXSlOl of Block 
3a f f l a t •<:•, Sal t Lake City Suf*ay, 
T o o t h e r with tha f o l l o w i n g daaer ibed p o r t i o n of vacated 
Qlan4ala S t r e e t a d j o i n i n g on tha S t a t s C ^ o a t a o l n t 8 2 . 3 
f a a t Hortc f r o i tha Southeaet corner of Lot 1, H o c k 2 , 
aald J0NC3 SUBDIVISION, and running thtnca Horth t'< f a s t 
t o tha H o r t h e i a t oorn«f of sa id U*. 23 ; thanca Saat 33 
f s e t ; thanca South 3 i # » 2 l *ea t 3 9 . * * f a a t t o tha p o i n t 
of cocsonctr.ont. 
T o g e t h e r with tha Worth o n e - h a l f of f a c a t t d F i r s t South 
S tree t adje in inj on tha South. 
PARCEL NO, 8* 
Tho following described portion of vacated First'South 
Street being tha South one-!»alf of vacated First South 
Street lying between the Weit line of 1100 West: Street 
and the West line of Clendala Street produced across First 
South Streets Beginning at a point 66*045 faat South of 
the Noxthweat Corner of 1100 West and 100 South, which 
corner ia aia > tha Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 54, 
Plat *C*, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thanca 
South 66.043 feet} thence West 330.0 feet; thence North 
66.045 feet) thenca Eaat 330.0 faat to tne point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL NO. 9: 
X. 
The fol lowing descri.md portion of vac i ted Gler-Jale S tree t s 
Bee inning at the Sov heaat cornor of Lot 1, Blcck 2e Jones 
Subdivis ion of Block 54, Plat *C", S a l ; LaX i C t y Survey 
and running thenca Ntrth 82.5 f ee t i thence Nox .- 33* 42* 
Cast 59.48 f e e t ; thence South 132.0 fee t thenci West 33 
f e e t to tha point of beginning. 
Together with the North one-half of vacated F i r s t South 
S t r e e t adjoining on tha South. 
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EXHIBIT "Ii: 
ATE OF UTAH, \ 
| ss. 
ty and County of Salt Lake, ) 
I, Mildred V. Higham
 f C i t y Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby 
rtify that the attached document is a full, true and correct copy of B i l l No. 173, an 
ordinance vacating Glendale and Firs t South Stree t s west of 1100 West 
Street located in Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah, 
>assed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, October 5f 1977 
is appears of record in my office. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said 
City, this 21st day of December 1978 
(SEAL) 
City Recorder 
EXHIBIT 
AN ORDINANCE 
AN ORDINANCE VACAT-
ING Glendale and First South 
Streets west of UOO West Street 
located in Salt Lake Dry, Utah. 
Be It ordained by the Board of 
Commissioner* of Salt Lake 
City. Utah. 
SECTION V That Glendale 
and First South Streets west of 
1100 West Street located in Salt 
Lane City, Utah, more particu-
larly described as follows be, 
and the same hereby Is. vac-
ated and declared no longe*- to 
be public property tor use as a 
Street, tvtnvt. alley or pedes-
frian w a v 
Beginning at me Southeast 
corner o» Lot 1, Block 1. Jones' 
Subdivision. Block $4 Plat " C " , 
Salt Lake City Survey, said 
point also being me Northwest 
corner of 1100 West end First 
South Streets, and running 
thence South V T S3" East 
133 17 feet, thence West 334.00 
feet, thence North 0* 00 55" 
West J l i 63 feet to me North 
east corner of Lot I. Block 7, 
said Jones' Subdivision: thence 
North 3J 4? East $9 48 tee', 
mence East 36.00 feet to me 
Northwest corner of Lot 7, 
Block l. said Jones' Subdivi-
lion, thence Sooth 13? 00 feet. 
thence East 3*4 00 feet to pomt 
Of beginning Contains Si. 113 32 
•Quart feet, or M I 0 acres 
Said vacation Is made e«-
•ressty subied to an eiisting 
rights of wav and easements of 
an public utilities of any and 
every description now located 
on. In. under or over me 
confines o* the above described 
property, and also subfect to 
the rights of entry thereon for 
the purpose of maintaining. 
altering, repairing, replacing. 
removing or rerouting said 
uliitt.es and all of them 
SECTION 1 This ordinance 
Shan fake effect 30 days after 
Its first publication 
Passed by the Board of Com. 
missioners of San Lake City, 
Utah, this Sm day of October. 
1?77. 
TED L. WILSON 
Mayor 
MILDRED V. MIGHAM 
Cltv Recorder (SEAL) 
BILL NO 173 of W 7 
Pubiitnati October IS. 1f77 
CB-6) 
THIS TRUST DEED Is Bade this 6 —day of July, 1977, between 
LEMEL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and MELVIN E. INGERSOLL end KAR1AN 
BEVERLY INGERSOLL, his wife, and LELAN2 R. INGERSOLL and EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, 
his wife, as Trustors, all of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Stare of 
Utah, BACKMAN ABSTRACT & TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and GENERAL BREWING COMPANY, 
a California corporation, as Beneficiary. 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER 
OF SALE, the. following described property situated in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah: 
PARCEL 1; All of Block 43, Plat f,CMt Salt Lake City Survey. 
PARCEL 2: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot B, Block 43, 
Plat MC M, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 4 feet; 
thence South 660 feet; thence Vest 4 feet to the Southeast corner 
of Lot 1 of said Block 43; thence North 660 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL 3: Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block 43, and 
running thence Vest 99 feet; thence North 247o5 feet; thence Vest 163 
feet, core or less, to the East Bank of the Jordan River; thence 
Northerly along said East Bank to a point due Vest froo the Northwest 
comer of said Block 43; thence East to the Nort>west corner of said 
Block 43; thence South 660 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL A: All of the South half of vacated First South Street lying 
between the Vest line of Cleodale Street produced and the East Bank of 
the Jordan River. 
PARCEL 5: Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block 44, ,s,lat "CM, 
Salt Lake City Survey,and running thence North 10 rods; thence East 
10 rods; thence South 10 rod:;; thence Vest 10 reds to the point of 
beginning. 
PARCEL 6s All of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54, Plat 
MC", Salt 1~* e City Survey. 
Together with the East half of vacated Clendale Street adjoining 
on the Wr.t. 
PARCEL 7: All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54, 
Plat "C", S^lt Lake City Survey. 
Together with the following described portion of vacated Clen-
dale Street adjoining on the East: Comoencing 82.5 feet North froo the 
Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running 
thence North 66 feet to the Northeast corner of said Lot 23; thence East 
33 feit; thenc« South 33*42* West 59.48 feet to the point of comsenceoent. 
Together with the North one-half of vacated First South Street 
adjoin*LI; on the South. 
SUBJECT TO TliE F0LL0VING: 
1. An easement for construction and maintenance of an underground conduit along 
the following described line: 
BEGINNING 45.23 feet West of the City Engineer's M O M A C M 
on 10th West Street *»d 56 feet South of City Engineer** 
Monument on First Souih Street, ind running t^snee West 
327.27 feet; as created in favor of Utah Power and Light 
CoDpany, a corporation, by instrument recorded November 18, 
3916 as Entry No. 369^08, Book 3-C, Page 218. 
Right of Way for a Railroad spur tract, said right of way being 8-1/2 
feet on each side of, and measured at right angles to, the following 
described center line: 
BEGINNING at a point West 411.* feet free the Southwest 
corner of the Intersection of 10th West Street and First 
South Street, running thence Southerly on a 15*30* curve 
to the right A distance of 97.6 feet; thence Southerly on 
a ta.igent to said curve 142,8 feet; thence on a 14* curve 
to the left 172.2 feet to a point on the West line of 10th 
West Street which point is North 113.3 feet from the North 
line of Second South Street; as created in favor of the 
Western Pacific Rfcilroad Company, a corporation,, by instrument 
recorded June 27, 1921 as Entry Ho. 452855 in Book 11-1, 
page 81. 
By Agreemtr.t recorded September 9, 192i, Entry No. 542833 in Book 3-V, 
page 573, 6aid Western Pacific Rallroai Cor.pany granted an easement and 
right-of-way over a portion of above discribett tract to Oregon Short 
tine Railroad Company. 
An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Lntry No. 542834 in Book 3-W, 
pfige 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western 
P.ic-fic Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a 
corporation, second party, which provides for relocation of present 
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a 
plat marked Schedule MA" attached thereto. 
A perpetual casement for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of 
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to wit: 
An Irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43, 
Plat MC", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions 
of vacated First South Street (together with other property 
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in 
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry No. 551852 in 
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252. 
A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line: 
BEGINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running 
West on First South Street, 15 feet South of the center line 
thereof, to the Jordan F.ver; as created in favor of Utah Gas 
6 Coke Company by instn.-aent recorded July 27, 1949, ss Entry
 9 
No. 637186 in Book 44, Page 589 of Official Records. g 
A Pole Line Easement over the following described center line: 
CD 
BEGINNING at a point S;»ith 89*53'22" West 470 feet j§ 
from a Monument at the intersection of First South £* 
and Glendale Strerta, and running thence South 0*12'22H 
West 51 feet; thence North 89#5B'22M Eest 436.8 feet; 
as created in favor of Utah Po^er and Light Company, a 
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as 
Entry No. 1009&87 in Paok 434, Page 609 of Official 
Records. 
7. A Right of Way for a 3 inch vater pipeline along the following described 
line: 
BECINN1NC at a point South 123U jeci and East 313f> fret 
from the Northwest comer of Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt take Base and Meridian, and Tunning 
thence South 83*10f East 155 fest; thence South 25*30* 
East 85 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of Vater, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201402 in 
Bc-jic 768, Page 266 of Official fcecrds 
8. A perpetual easement for a drainage ditrh along the :'©Tth sSde of Vest 
First South Street, together with the right of the I i°y to enlarge said 
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in instrument recorded September 22, 
1925, as Entry Nn. 543644 in Book 12-H, page 524 of OKieial Records. 
9. A Pole Line Easemcrt granted to Ut;«h Power * Light Cocpany as recorded 
January 16, 19U . !i» Book 177",, Page 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official 
Records, fo- th* election and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacem it of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of ..»ie Grantee and two anchors and three poles along a line 
described .•' cile*s: 
BECINN N~ t a point vithin an existing transmission line which 
is 900 feet South and 1139 feet East, more or less, from 
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 Scuth, Rarge 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49' West 540 feet 
on said land and being in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
10. A Pole M " f > asecent granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded 
January l'> .Ul, in Book 1773, Page 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official 
Records, i .he erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and rej.la. • t of the electric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of ne Grantee and one guy and 3 poles along a line described as 
follows: 
BEGINNING at a fence on the North boundary line of the Grantors' 
land at a point 845 feet South and 1170 feet East, more or less, 
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 0*02' Last 740 feet, 
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of said land 
and being In Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
11. Any other rights of way and easements for roads, ditches, canals, utilities, 
pipe lines, etc., which may exist over, under or across 6aid land. 
TOGETHER WITH all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, 
rights-of-way, easemests, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditarints, 
privileges and •PJ>J*JJtea£fic_e8 thereunto now or hereafter u9ed or enjoyed with said 
property, or any part thereof; 
o» 
FOR THE fBUPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a £ 
promissory note of enn date herewith, in the principal sum of $1,300,000.00, payable^ 
CO 
to the order of Beneffciary at the times, in the manner and with in:erest aathen-in 3 
set forth, and paymeat of any auma expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the ££ 
security hereof. H* 
Trustor
 agrccs to pay all .axeo and assessments on thv above proptrty, 
to pay all charges
 %nd assessments on water or water stock used on ci v»th *nu 
property, not to co^^t waste, to maintain adequate fire insurance on Improvements 
un said property, *0 pay all costs and expenses of collecrion (including Trustee's 
and attorney's fees ^n event of default, in payment of the Indebtedness secured 
hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of *hi services performed by 
Xtus_t*j> hexeundfLV jj^j^jj^ * mexveyaxc* h*T*>S. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default 
and of any notice Of
 g a i e hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore 
set forth. 
MELV1K E. INCERSOLL 
MARIAN BEVERLY'IrtGERSpLt // 
LtlJSd^K. 1NGERS0LL - , 
EVELY* E. I N 3 E R S 0 L LQ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lak
€
; ss 
^* i s« t f t<he 6 ^ day of Cfl^^/ ' l 9 7 7 » P^J'sonally appeared befo 
^fe^VTK'E., INRERSOl^  „ J>TB7I&BJ>I* *!>d JLEIAVD X, MPZXSDLL, 33 SBCTB13T? 
fore me 
t^ >Rfc0.RA*19N, a Utah corporation, and each duly acknowledged to me that they 
^exejut*^ the^foregoing instrument on behalf of said corporation by authority of 
''
 a 4 ^ j t f l 8 l t 0 n ?J t h e t o a r d o f directors of said corporation and that each acknowledged g 
V ? , , , , ' " . £ V ' (7 NOTARY gpfiLIC 3 
Kr^&miMion expires J7h/ 9 tf7? Residing at £/UtrT f/&A#fT (STXf/ £ 
"
a
 Jl? ^rL°n board of directors of said corporation and that each acknowled 
*2 c ^ ^ ? ' f A K s ¥ d corporation executed the same and the seal affixed i s the seal of 
s-
STATE < 
County 
OF \ 
of 
*On 
JTAH 
<i,Ot 
the 
) 
88 
Lake! 
jfr^da , 1977, ; srsonally appeared before 
.. m ^ J W ^ N E. INGERSOLL, MARIAN BEVfffcLY 1NGKRS0LL, hie wife, and LELAND R. TKGERSOLL 
/',>and EVELYN L. lNGERSOLLe his wife, signers of the within lt>« :ruxnent, who du3y 
/ iJ ^jL^novM^a^d .to me that they executed the same. 
\ ^ M s c ^ ^ i o n j x p i r e s - S ^ r t / Y.tf?? Residing at frfr/fr/fa/1/+TT (yrX« 
9 
2 
8 
Jfecorded at Hequeet © f . - . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r S ^ k ^ . ^ J ' ^ _ 
•t ~ M. Fee Paid % ~-J&-J%-*3^^ 
by „ _ pep. Book. .. Page Ref.: « 
Moil tax notice to Addrees...~ _... 
3431368 QUIT CLAIM DEED 
MELVIN E. INGERSOIL and KARL-:; BEVERLY rCERSOLL, his wife, and 
LEL^ ND R. INCERSOLL and EVELYN E. EJCERSOLL, his wife, grantors 
of Sa l t Lake City . County of Salt Lake , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT CLAIM to UMEL CORPORATION, 
of 
. . ^? . , .in^"t*or-otKr"coo3"an3"vaIuatIe °consI3eratIon7" the following described tract of Janata 
State of Ut ah to wit: 
for the rum of 
DOLLARS 
Salt Lake Cennty. 
^/C *& 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO 
WITNESS the hand of §oid p^antor , tb! 
Signed in tho pretence of 
STATE OF tJTAH. 
County of Salt lake 
On the day of (*y 
^t-^V!"^/'j^vi. 
1* 80, 
personally Appeared before me •• <S - CD 
W2.VIN E. rtTERSOLL and mRIAN BEVERLY INCERSOL, his wife, and VDJttfl'J • r ' \ V • =r 
INCERSOLL and EVELYN E. INCERSOLL . h i s wife " • / ; i * .-• fc 
the iip>eis ol the foregoing instrument, who duly acknjwledtftd to m* that t he y executed the' tame. ^ 
. • ^ ^ J V C J L J ^ ^ * 
l..j ;««n~ -;" •• •ir*"**!**.1'* Notary Public, retu'ing at 
My eon,m..,«o„ . . p l „ . . . . 1 : ^ 3 . ^ l t . . U t e _ C l ^ , . . U c a h . „ . . 
T««e octp miMTto t«#cr**u.« rom t«oTO.«cco«oiN«. vet ec*c« IN*, AND rrrc. 
EXHIBIT "VI' 
SCHEDULE "A" 
Parcel 1: Q jpq - <*/J~ /Z. 
All of Block A3, P la t "C*\ Salt Lake City Survey. 
Parcel 2s 
BFGIKMNG at the Kortheast corner of Lot 8B Block A3, .^ 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence (2^'^^ - i& 
East A.O feet; thence So-ith 660.C feet: thence .Jest 
A.G feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 1 of said Block 
A3-; thence North 660.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 3: 
, )' BEGIKMNC at the Southwest corner of said BlocJ' A3, and 
1 ' running thc~re Vest 99.0 feet; thence North 2A7.5 feet; 
, thence Vest 163.0 feet, core or le«s, to the Ea'-t Bank ~ __ 
^ of the Jordan River; thence Northerly along said East Ay &3~ ~7~ ,<- / 
" Batik to a point due Vest fros the Northve»t corne- of 
said Block A3; thence East to the Northvrst corner of 
said Block A3; thence South 660.0 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Parcel A; 
All of the South half of vacated First South Street lying ~J&\-Ztlm^J 
1 between th*» VI st line of Clendale Street produced and the (East Bank of the Jordan Fiver. 
Parcel 3: 
CO.^XNCINC at the Southwest corner of Block AA# Plat MC", ^^Y/CJ-Z/S' * 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods; 
thence East 10 rods; thence South 10 rods; thence Vest 
/ 10 rods to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 6: 
•\ 
j / All of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A, 
Plat MC", Salt lake City Survey. e - 7 7 - ^ 
l/ TOGETHER WITH the Eant half of vacated Clendale Street adjoining on the Vest 
Parcel 7; 
rarcei /; * 
S All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A,^{C^/-Z 87 
Plat "CM, Salt Lake City Survey. " 
TOGETHER VITH the following described portion of vacated Clendale 
Street adjoining en the East: 
O 
& 
.'OTtwt Of DtrAVLT 
3304045 
NOTICF IS HEREBY GIVEN: That RICHARD L. liLANCK is 
Trustee under a Deed of Trust dated July 6, 1977, executed by 
LeKal Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvm E. Ingersoll end 
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, Leiand R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. 
Ingersoil, his wife, in which General Brewing Company, i 
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman 
Abstract b Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18, 
1977, as Entry No. 29713J0, in Book 4519, at Page 1159, of 
Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Laxe County, Utah, describing land therein as: 
SEE AITACKMFNT 
Said obligations include a note in the principal hum of 
$1,800,000.00. 
A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which 
such deed is security has occurred in that payments due en August 
1, 1979 and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of $55,316.66, 
have not beed paid. 
By reason of such default, Richard L. Blanck, as 
Trustee, and General Brewing Company, as Beneficiary, under said 
Deed of Trust, do hereby declare all sums secured thereby i-nre-
diately due £*nd payable and have elected and do hereby elect to 
cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
secured thereby. 
DATED this 7th day of September. 
KICHARU L. BLANCK, Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On t h i s 7th day of September, persona l ly appeared betore 
me Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice ot 
Defau.l/t,/ who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
J
. * i • • * : « ; NOTARY PUBLIC 
\ \&{jft\J$* Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
\ ^ \ • ^  •< 
''M^£^*aVion ^Expires: f 
EXHIBIT MVIIf 
Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry Ho. S42S13 in Book 3-V, 
J^me 573 „ said Western Pacific Kail TO ad Company granted an •atcoent and 
rjght~of-vsy over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short 
j.ine JUilroad Company. 
An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry Wo. 54283*. in Book 3-V, 
psge 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western 
Pacific Kailroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., n 
corporation, second party, vhich provides for relocation vf present 
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a 
plat Barked Schedule "AH attached thereto* 
A perpetual casesent for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line 
JUilroad Coop any and the Western Pacific Kailroad Coapany for a Right of 
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to vit: 
An irregular traet of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43, 
?lat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions 
of vacated First South Street (together vith other property 
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in 
instrument rwarded January 20, 1926 as Tntry Wo. 551852 in 
Book 3 X of Liens and Leases, page 252. 
A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and reaoval 
of a gas pipe line along the following described line: 
BIG1NKXHC at the Vest line of 10th West Street, and running 
Vest on First South Street, 15 feet Sovth of the center line 
thereof, to the Jordan Xiver; as created is favor of Utah Cat 
a Coke Company by Instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry 
Wo. 61718$ in Book 44, TMJ • 589 of Official Records. 
A Pol* Line Easeaent over the following described center line: 
BEC1NN1NC at a point South B9*58'22" Vest 470 feet 
froa a Monuaent at the intersection of First South 
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0*12,22f' 
Vest 51 feet; thence Korth 89*5B'22H East 43*.8 feet; 
as created in favor of I'tah Power and Light Cospany, a 
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as 
Entry Wo. 10090B7 in Book 434,-1'agc 609 of Official 
Records. 
A Right of Vay for a 3 inch water pipeline along the following described 
line: 
BICXNN1HC at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet 
froa the Worthwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake laae and Meridian, and running 
thence South 83*10* East 155 feet; thence South 25*30' 
East 85 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation 
of Vater, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry *©. 1201402 in 
Book 768, Fage 266 of Official Records. 
A perpetual caseDcnt for a drainage ditch along the Worth side of Vest 
First South Street, together vith the right of tke City to enlarge said 
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in instrument recorded September 22, 
1925, as Entry Wo. 543644 in Book 12-B, psge 524 of Olflclsl Records. 
A ?ols Line Easement granted to Utah Fover 4 Light Coapany as recorded 
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Fage 242, Entry Wo. 1756733, Official 
Records, for the arectlon and continued maintenance, repair, slteratlcn, 
and rcplaccaent of the alsctric transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of the Grantee and tvo anchon and thrss poles along a line 
described as follows: 
BECTKNIWG at a point vithin an existing transmission lins vhlch 
is 900 fast South and 1139 feet East, mors or Isss, from 
the Worthwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Vest, Sslt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*499 Vest 540 fsst 
en paid land and being in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2. 
^ pole Line Eaeeaent granted to Utah Power I tight Company as recorded 
January 16, 196^, In Book 1773, Page 243, Intry Ko. 1756734, Official 
Jlecords, for the arectloo and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, 
and replacement of the alectrlc transmission distribution and telephone 
circuits of tha Grantee and ona guy and 3 poles along a line described as 
follows: 
irxiKHXHC at a fence cm the north boundary line of the Cr ant ore* 
land at a point 845 feet South and 117C fast Cast, aore or lets. 
Iron the Northwest corner of Section 2, Tovnship 1 South, Kange 
1 Vest, Salt LaVa Meridian, thence South 0*02* Cast 740 feet. 
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of aald land 
and being In Lots 3 and 6 of aald Section 2* 
Any other rlghta of vay and easeaeats for roads, ditches, canals, utilities, 
pipe lines, a t e , vhlch may exist over, under or across said land. 
mi r> $S? 
»1»CEL BO. ^^ 
All of Block 43, Pitt •C"# Silt Like City Survey 
PABCEL 10, 2s 
Beginning i t the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 43. Plat 
•C", S i l t Lake City Survey and running thence East 4 f e e t ; 
thenct South 660 f e e t ; thence Vest 4 feet to the Southeast 
corner of Lot 1 of said Block 43; thence North 660 f e e t 
to the point of beginning. 
PiPCEL 10, V* 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block 43, and 
running thence Vest 99 feet; thence North 247.5 feet; thence 
Vest 163 f e e t , more or l e s s , to the East bank of the Jordan 
Biver; thence Northerly along said East bank to a po int 
due Vest from the Northwest corner of said Block 43; thence 
East to the Northwest corner of said Block 43; thence South 
660 feet to the point of beginning. 
PABCEL 10, *; 
All of the South half of vacated First South Street lying 
between the Vest l ine of Glendale Street produced and the 
East Bank of the Jordan Fiver. 
PARCEL 10 , 5; 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block 44, Plat "C", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods; 
thence East 10 rods: thence South 10 rods; thence Vest 
10 rods to the point of beginning. 
PABCEL 10 . 6; 
a l l of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54, Plat 
•C", Salt Lake City Survey. 
Together with the east half of vacated Glendale Street 
adjoining on the Vest. 
3 
8. 
3 
i.niFN RECORDED HAIL TO: 
interstate Land Corporation 
,9710 South 5200 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84U84 
Co ~ o o © 
- j 0 ) i " ^ ^ SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
GENERAL BREWING COMPANY, a corporation "vgnrized and 
ex i s t ing under the L w s of the State of California, with its principal 
office at 79 S t . Thomas Way, Tiburon, California, herebv c o n v e y s and 
warrant* against all claims b y , through or under GRANTOR to 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION. GRANTF.F. for the sum of Ten and 
no/100 Dollars ($10 .00) and other good and valuable consideration the 
tract of b n d in Salt Lake County , " t a n . described on Erhibit "A" which 
is at ached here to . 
THE OFFICER whu s iuns this deed herehv certif ies that th.s 
deed and the transfer represented thereby *'ts duly authorizeu under a 
resolution duly adopted bv the Board of Directors of the GRANTOR at a 
lawful meeting duly h«?ld and attended by a quorun.. 
IN WITN-SS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate 
name and stal to be hereunto affixed by it« duly authori-.ed officer this 
fTL d*y of IUJUU^ W 4 . 
GENERAL BRFVMNG CJ»1PANY 
PRESIDENT 
1^1 STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
HI : ss. 
COUNTY OP CLAPK ) 
t 
°^  On the 7th day of February 19F4. personally appeared 
before me CARL E. MULLEN, J R . , being by me duly sworn, did «ay that 
h e . the said CARL E. MULLEN. J R . . is the President of the General 
Brewing Company and that the within and foregoing instrument was 
s igned on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its 
Board of Directors and said CARL E. MULLEN, J R . , duly acknowledged «* 
to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed *Z 
is the seal of said corporation. C* 
CJ 
W T A ^ \ gf f i fa<Mn > \$ foV*tr£Vt»t« ! Km 
WashingtoVi, resfdmg at Vancouver O T » , 
J* 
EXHIBIT "VIII" 
finest, to, 11 
All of Bloc* *3, flit #C»t Silt Likt City Survty 
fllCtl fQ. 21 
B t | l n n l n | i t tht Worth*->t eorntr of Lot 8, Block *3. f l i t 
•C% S i l t Likt City Surr»y tnd running thtnet f i s t * f t t t ; ' 
th tnet South 660 f t t t ; thtnet Vut I f t t t to the Southtist 
eorntr of Lot 1 of e i l d Block *3; thtnet Krrth 660 f t t t 
to tht point of bt i lnnln i . 
fktCIL 10. * i 
B t | l n n l n | i t tht Southwest eorntr of s l i d Bloek *3 , md 
runoini thtnet Vtit 99 f t t t ; thtnet Korth 2*7.5 f t t t ; thtnet 
Vtst 163 ff• 11 tort ir l t i s f to tht Cut bank of tht JorCin 
BiTtr; thtbet northerly a loni Slid t t s t bink m 1 po in t 
due Vtst froe tht Horthwtst eorntr of n l d Block *>!; thtr.se 
t u t to tht Horthvtst eorntr of s i ld Bloek 13; thtr.ee South 
660 f t t t to tht point of b t | l n n l n | . 
pilCtL *Q. It 
Al l of tht South h i l f of v i e i t t d First South Strt t t ly ini 
bttvttn tht Vtst l in t of CItndi l t S t r t t t pr.duetd end tht 
t u t tink of tht Jordan ftlvtr. 
UlPZLJUUll 
Coietne.'nc *t tht Southvtst eorntr of Bloek e i , f l i t 'C*, 
S i l t Likt City Survey, and running thtnet Korth 10 rods; 
- h t n r t Ci s t 10 r o d s : t h t n e t South 10 rods; th tnet Vtst 
10 rU% to tht point of beginning. 
nni is, t; 
• 11 of Lot 3 , Block 1 f JOMtS SUBDIVISION of Block 5«, f l i t 
•Z99 S i l t Likt City Surrey. 
To | t t :«er v i t h t h t t e s t h i l f of u c . u d CItndi l t S t r t t : 
i d J c i o U l oe the Veet. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
•*• 
m c g L fg> ** 
.U- of Lett 1 tod 2 3 . Bloek 2, JC*t3 SUBtIv:*;oM of Block 
$1, f U t 9C\ Salt Uke City Surety. 
3 | e t h s r with the fo l lowing described portion of vacated 
i tnda l t S t - t t t t d j o l n l n f on thf East; C c i c t n c l n c 8?. ' . 
f i t t JCorth fro« the Southeast corner of lot 1, Block 2, 
•aid J0NF5 SUBDIVISION, and running thtnee Mrth 66 f t t t 
t o t b t Kcrthfttf t oorntr of aaid l o t 23- #lkenee f a i t 33 
feeO* thence South 33 , *2* Vast 59.*8 f a i t ;o tha po in t 
of aoms»noaa< At. 
Togt thaf ^itn the 
Strtat • i j c ' n i i i oo 
Worth ona«h*Xf of vacated F irs t South 
tha South. 
FAS'tL >70. 3t 
The following described portion of vacated First South 
Street being the South one-half of vacated First South 
Stteet lying between the West line of 1100 West Street 
and the wtst line of Clendale Street produced across First 
$:>jth Street. Beginning at a point 66.045 ftet South of 
the Northwest Cor.ier of 1100 West and 100 South, which 
ecrntr ia also tne Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 54, 
Plat *C", 5»lt eke City Survey, and running thence 
South 66.04$ fet ; .hence w*st 330.0 feet; ther.ce North 
66.C45 feet; thence East 330.0 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
PM.CEL NO. f i 
Tha following Aescrir^J portion of vacated Clendale Street: 
Beginning at the Southea:-'. corner of Lot 1, Block 2. Jones 
Subdivieio.i of Block St, *>lat "C*. Salt Uke City Survey 
•nd running thence NortJ. 12.5 feet; tnenca North 33* 42* 
Eaet 59.48 ftetf thence South 132.0 f«et thence West 33 
feet to the point of becinning. 
Together with the North on«»-helf of vacated Firet South 
Street adjoining on the South, 
SUBJECT TO TBI FOLLOWING MGHVS OF WAY AN3 EAStKINTi AND XNTERISTS: 
X. 
"lot. br i«.J/"* ° f ° t , h , s " r 4 U « h t Cotp.ny, . lorlll: 
•3-
ADDENDUM 
B. Statute and Rules Text 
Rule 5: Local Rules of the Third Judicial District Court 
Rule 56(c): Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 59; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 5 RULES OF PRACTICE—3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
(d) All motions for summary judgment or other dispositive motions must be 
heard at least thirty (30) days before the date set for trial. No such motion 
shall be heard after that date without leave of court. 
Rule 5. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and of the State of 
Utah shall not apply in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(a) Filing of proposed orders, judgments or decrees. In all rulings 
by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen (15) days or such shorter time as the court may direct, file 
with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with 
the ruling. 
(b) Service of proposed orders, judgments or decrees; objections. 
Copies of the proposed order, judgment or decree in civil and domestic 
cases shall be served on opposing counsel before being present to the 
court for signature unless approved as to form by opposing counsel, or the 
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be filed with the 
court and served on opposing counsel no later than five (5) days after 
service of said proposed order, judgment or decree. 
(c) Stipulated settlements; dismissals. Stipulated settlements and 
dismissals shall be reduced to writing and presented to the court for 
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal. 
(d) Default judgments. Default judgments which require a judge's 
signature shall be submitted to the judge assigned to the case. Default 
judgments which include an award of attorney's fees shall be supported 
by an attorney's fee affidavit which sets forth: (1) the legal basis for the 
award of the attorney's fees requested; (2) the amount requested; and (3) 
evidence that the amount requested constitutes a fair and reasonable fee 
for the services performed. 
Rule 6. Pretr ial calendar. 
This rule modifies Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. 
Pretrial hearings in civil cases will be held when so ordered by the court. 
Pretrial hearings will be held before the judge who has been assigned the 
case. Motions for pretrial hearings may be filed at any time. Such motions 
shall set forth with particularity why a pretrial hearing is requested. The 
court may order in any case that such motions must be accompanied by a 
proposed pre-trial order in the format set out in the Rules of Practice of the 
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah; or that such a pretrial order 
be prepared before a final settlement conference or trial date is set. 
Rule 7. Motions for supplemental proceedings. 
Motions for supplemental proceedings will be set on the regular weekly 
supplemental proceedings calendar before a clerk of the court. Counsel may 
alternatively schedule the matter to be heard before the judge assigned to the 
case on the assigned judge's regular law and motion calendar. 
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Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appear: ^r^, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.K.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
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(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satis-
faction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satis-
faction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment 
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket 
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same 
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal Cross-References. — Fee not charged for 
rule covering this subject matter. filing satisfaction, § 21-2-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Court. 
—Duty. 
—- —Attachment. 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
——Hearing. 
bv the judgment. Sierra Nevada Mill Co. v. 
Keith O'Brien Co., 48 U. 12, 156 P. 943. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
ment does not include his personal right to exe-
cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C. V. 
Federal Credit Union v. Jenkins, 52* P.2d 
1187. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59- New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new7 trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions ol 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
Court 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
collected through attachment proceeding. 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 U. 110, 86 P. 805. 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
charge everything merged in and adjudicated 
180 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion R u ] e go6. 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
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Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249 (1955\\ Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 439 > 
32* P 2d 722 H958); Howard v. Howard, l l 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley *• 
Sun Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 12& 
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General BldrS-
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 6* 
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2<* 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir 
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 31& 
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols «• 
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); E d a T 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); T h n e ^ ' 
Fin. Corp. v. Brimhall, 575 P.2d 701 ( ^ 
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P 2d ?H 
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. OsborV 
soil-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1931V 
Kohier v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utak 
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. GariL 
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson^ 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); GohW 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730 (Utafe 
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utafc 
1985 . York v. Unqualified Washington 
Countv Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (UfcA 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Tri^ 
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 iu 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq-> 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case* 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of. civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner *n 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view fry 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial 
of ci\il case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of 6uch attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has* been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal. 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial. 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=> 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; ixa\id, etc. On motion and ixpwfc sraV* \srrn* as. at*yatft, Vne coxcrt, may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
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new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
SiC or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendanthas 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P. to set aside judgment, § 21-2-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Other reasons. 
—"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Default judgment. 
Imposibility of compliance with order. 
—r-Incompetent counsel. 
Lack of due process. 
Merits of case. 
Mistake or inadvertencce. 
Real party in interest. 
Requirements. 
—Effect of set-aside judgment. 
Admissions. 
—Fraud. 
Divorce action. 
—Independent action. 
Constitutionality of taxes. 
Divorce decree. 
Fraud or duress. 
Motion distinguished. 
—Invalid summons. 
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